Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law
Volume 18 | Issue 3

Article 11

2010

Gimme Some More: Centering Gender and
Inequality in Criminal Justice and Discretion
Discourse
Shaun Ossei-Owusu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Criminal Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Ossei-Owusu, Shaun. "Gimme Some More: Centering Gender and Inequality in Criminal Justice and Discretion Discourse." American
University Journal of Gender Social Policy and Law 18, no. 3 (2010): 607-624.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

Ossei-Owusu: Gimme Some More: Centering Gender and Inequality in Criminal Just
OSSEI-OWUSU 3/7/10

10/22/2010 2:26:08 PM

GIMME SOME MORE:
CENTERING GENDER AND
INEQUALITY IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
AND DISCRETION DISCOURSE
SHAUN OSSEI-OWUSU*

I. Introduction ............................................................................................608
II. Understanding Discretion .....................................................................612
A. Discretion as Discreetness .........................................................612
B. Widening Our Lens ....................................................................613
III. Sites and Stages of Discretion .............................................................614
A. Understanding Institutional Fields and Bureaucratic
Patriarchy.................................................................................614
B. Police Practices and Preemptive Investigations .........................616
C. Arrests ........................................................................................619
D. Charging.....................................................................................620
IV. Conclusion...........................................................................................622

* Ph.D. student, University of California, Berkeley, Department of African
American Studies; Doctoral Fellow, American Bar Foundation; B.S. 2007,
Northwestern University; M.L.A. 2008, University of Pennsylvania. Portions of this
article were presented at the LatCrit XIV Conference at the Washington College of
Law at American University from October 1-4, 2009 and emerge out of a larger project
entitled “Slipping through the Chasms: The Criminal Justice System and the Interstices
of Discretion” (forthcoming). My work has benefited immensely from comments and
conversations with Kathryn Abrams, Paul Butler, Pamela Bridgewater, Mary Louise
Frampton, Ian Haney Lopez, Richard Iton Jasmine Johnson, Asia Leeds, John
Marquez, Ianna Owens, Stephanie Patterson, Ava Purkiss, Song Richardson, Stephen
Small, Sandra Smith, Krystal Strong, and Aileen Tejeda. Participants and attendees at
LatCrit XIV, the Law and Society Association Annual Meeting, the UC Berkeley Race
Seminar, and the Social Justice Seminar at Boalt Hall offered incisive feedback. None
of these individuals should be held responsible for or presumed to agree with the
arguments made here. My research has been generously supported by the National
Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship Program and the Berkeley Empirical Legal
Studies Fellowship at UC Berkeley, Boalt Hall.

607

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2010

1

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 18, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 11
OSSEI-OWUSU 3/7/10

608

10/22/2010 2:26:08 PM

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 18:3

“I’ve always met more discrimination being a woman than being black.”
Shirley Chisholm1
I. INTRODUCTION
Criminologists, critical outsider theorists,2 and socio-legal scholars have
scratched the surface, but need to do more excavating on the role of
discretion in the criminal justice system. Much of the literature on the
criminal justice system focuses on criminality (putative or actual) and
examines how discriminatory practices and policies disproportionately
impact Blacks and Latinos. These emphases have undoubtedly been
important to our understandings of crime and inequality, but they neglect
the role of bureaucratic discretion, which is an important site of inequality
in the criminal justice system. When discretion is considered, analysts
typically focus on individual or clustered stages (e.g. charging and plea
bargaining), but fail to think about discretion more broadly. What happens
when we begin to think about criminal justice discretion more expansively
and widen our gaze?
This question was the focus of a paper I presented at the Fourteenth
Annual LatCrit Conference as well as the theoretical and empirical plea I
offered to my audience. I had the privilege of presenting my paper on a
panel with my Berkeley colleague, Trevor Gardner, who gave a
presentation on policing and immigration,3 while having Paul Butler and
Pamela Bridgewater as our respective discussants. In my presentation I
argued that discretionary stages in the criminal justice system serve as key
sites of race, class, and gender subordination. I also argued for a more
cumulative approach to discretion as opposed to the predominant sociolegal approach of focusing on stages exclusively.
I received positive feedback on my analytical treatment of gender,
despite my own consternation of my gender analysis—a product of the
inherent difficulties of doing empirically-informed work on

1. Shirley Chisholm, Nation’s First Black Woman to Serve In Congress, Dies, JET
MAG., Jan. 24, 2005, at 16.
2. See Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the
Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2323 (1989) (defining outsider jurisprudence as
the various strands of literature associated with critical legal studies such as critical
race theory, feminist legal studies, LatCrit, and critical race feminism).
3. Trevor Gardner, Presentation at LatCrit XIV Conference: Prudent Profiling:
The Legal and Normative Orders at the Intersection of Immigration and Street Policing
(Oct. 2009).
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interdisciplinarity.4 Post-panel discussions with Professor Butler, Professor
Bridgewater, and other colleagues served as an impetus for a more robust
discussion on discretion and gender subordination, which will be the
conceptual focus of this symposium article.
The conference underlined the importance of “reading feminist” and
critically considering how the criminal justice process substantively
influences how we think about gender. This is particularly important
because even when race, class, gender, and other axes of difference are
considered in analyses, one or more of these categories may end up at the
forefront of the analyses while others are given short shrift. This is often
the case with gender, and my article seeks to invert traditional socio-legal
approaches to crime by making gender, along with race and class, the main
targets of inquiry, with a clear understanding that these classifications
interlock and intersect with other systems of discrimination, while
emphasizing that no individual category has full explanatory power in
understanding inequality in the criminal justice system.5
The organization of this article is straightforward. Part II deals with
semantics and offers a theoretical framework for thinking about discretion
in the criminal justice system. The framework offered here corresponds
with the four important points I emphasized at LatCrit. Firstly, cumulative
approaches to discretion offer a more expansive way to understand
inequality in the criminal justice system. Secondly, discretion must be
understood as the capacity to determine dispositional outcomes and as
discreetness.
Part III offers insight into gender discrimination by looking at specific
sites and stages in the criminal justice system and offers an additional item
to this framework. Thirdly, I argue that to investigate discretion, the
analyst must look at institutional fields/structures and how they influence
an actor’s patterned ways of thinking and behavior. My main intervention
here is to suggest that gender discrimination becomes more pronounced
when the conceptual lens expands from a focus on a single stage to
multiple phases. There are a plethora of stages and sites in the criminal
justice system where discretion is deployed, indeed, too many to capture in
4. See, e.g., Ange-Marie Hancock, When Multiplication Doesn’t Equal Quick
Addition: Examining Intersectionality as a Research Paradigm, 5 PERSP. ON POL. 63,
64-65 (2007) (discussing the challenges to identity politics posed by intersectionality);
Leslie McCall, The Complexity of Intersectionality, 30 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE &
SOC’Y 1771, 1771-73 (2005) (suggesting that intersectionality has created significant
methodological problems for women’s studies which are difficult to overcome).
5. This is one of the key premises of intersectionality theory. See Kimberlé
Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence
Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1244-45 (1991) (articulating
intersectionality as a concept and arguing against assumptions that gender and race are
essentially separate categories).
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one essay. Some of these include police practices and preemptive
investigations; actual investigations, arrests, and police reports;
interrogation; the decision to prosecute and whether to do so in adult or
juvenile court; prosecutorial charging and plea bargaining; conviction,
sentencing, probation, and parole; and finally, the decision to implement
the death penalty.6 While I do no not offer an exhaustive list of stages in
the criminal justice system, my intention is to sketch a general conceptual
framework that subsequent analyses could deploy to obtain more
substantive insight on discretion and discrimination in the criminal justice
system. Many broader societal problems and bureaucratic shortcomings
have been characterized by abuses of discretion7 and it is imperative for
scholars to focus their theoretical and doctrinal gaze on cumulative
discretion—especially in a post-intent moment where an ungenerous
American judiciary only recognizes purposeful discrimination.8
The final part of this article suggests that analyses on discretion must
look at institutional cleavages and use interdisciplinary insight to offer
policy and theoretical recommendations. The brunt of incarceration
significantly impacts women inside and outside of prisons. When men are
imprisoned, women typically take care of the children and when women
are imprisoned, other females often assume custody responsibilities.9 Twothirds of the women in prison are mothers who have children under the age
of eighteen and were often the heads of single parent households prior to
6. See DEPT. OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
FLOWCHART, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/largechart.cfm (last visited March 4,
2010) (presenting a useful diagram that captures many of these stages).
7. See generally ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE
AMERICAN PROSECUTOR (2007) (analyzing various aspects of prosecutorial discretion
and abuse of discretion and proposing reforms to ensure prosecutorial accountability);
STEVEN MAYNARD-MOODY & MICHAEL MUSHENO, COPS, TEACHERS, COUNSELORS:
STORIES FROM THE FRONT LINES OF PUBLIC SERVICE 3-50 (2003) (discussing how
“street-level” state agents exercise discretion differently); DOROTHY ROBERTS,
SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 7-25 (2001) (illustrating how the
discretion given to child welfare professionals leads to racially discriminatory
outcomes and inferior treatment, particularly for African-Americans); CELESTE
WATKINS-HAYES, THE NEW WELFARE BUREAUCRATS: ENTANGLEMENTS OF RACE,
CLASS, AND POLICY REFORM 33-34 (2009) (examining the interchange between
professional identity and discretion to explain the distribution of bureaucratic
resources).
8. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312-13 (1987) (buttressing the effect
and intent template and holding that statistical evidence of racial disparities in the
application of the death penalty is insufficient on its own); Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976) (holding that racial discrimination must exhibit a racially
disproportionate impact and a discriminatory motivation on the part of the state actor).
9. See MEDA CHESNEY-LIND, THE FEMALE OFFENDER: GIRLS, WOMEN, AND
CRIME 158 (1997) (contrasting the disparate impacts on families of female versus male
incarceration); Phyllis Goldfarb, Counting the Drug War’s Female Casualties, 6 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 277, 295 (2002) (noting that children of incarcerated women are
often placed in foster care if female relatives are unavailable or unable to care for
them).
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their incarceration.10 Many of these women are convicted of non-violent
drug and property offenses and return to communities with weak human
and social capital. They have no access to welfare benefits, public housing,
and educational loans. The absence of these civic goods ultimately impacts
mothers’ ability to demonstrate that they are responsible parents, which
leaves their children particularly vulnerable to a dysfunctional and biased
child welfare system.11 Women who are not incarcerated or convicted of
crimes often fall victim to a different kind of inequality caused by nontransparent policing and prosecution as well as abuses of discretion—
making the relationship between gender and the criminal justice system
integral to our broader understandings of social inequalities.12
Interdisciplinary analyses and examinations of institutional cleavages can
help effectively address many of these social problems.
Before proceeding, I must offer some important caveats. First, my
treatment of gender is focused particularly on women as opposed to men.
While I do engage issues surrounding masculinity, it is important to not fall
into the all-too-common trap of Black/Latino “racial victimhood”—where
Black and Latino men are perceived as being most vulnerable to and
endangered by crime and the criminal justice system.13 It is equally
important to heed the insights of feminist criminologists who have
illuminated the andocentric nature of mainstream criminology—a field of
study that often treats men as the norm and women as the anomalies.
When the experiences of females are recognized, criminologists often “add
women and stir” but neglect to engage in a substantive analysis of gender.14

10. MARC MAUER ET AL., GENDER AND JUSTICE: WOMEN, DRUGS AND SENTENCING
POLICY 2 (1999).
11. See ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 208-10 (describing the negative effects of the
stigma of conviction and incarceration on families).
12. See, e.g., JODY MILLER, GETTING PLAYED: AFRICAN AMERICAN GIRLS, URBAN
INEQUALITY, AND GENDERED VIOLENCE 41-48 (2008) (describing specific incidents of
violence against women and explaining how police discretion often leads to
underenforcement of domestic violence laws, resulting in disproportionately severe
impacts on poor and minority women and a perception among those women that police
will not protect them from abuse).
13. See Devon Carbado, Black Male Racial Victimhood, 21 CALLALOO 337, 337-38
(1998) (arguing that Black men occupy a privileged victim status in antiracist discourse
and in the Black community).
14. See Jeanne Flavin, Feminism for the Mainstream Criminologist: An Invitation,
29 J. CRIM. JUST. 271, 273 (2001) (discussing alternative analytical approaches to the
unique experiences of women in the American criminal justice system). See generally
Dana M. Britton, Feminism in Criminology: Engendering the Outlaw, 571 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 57, 58-59 (2000) (explaining that mainstream criminology
is largely masculinized, resulting in resistance to feminist analysis); Hillary Potter, An
Argument for Black Feminist Criminology: Understanding African American Women’s
Experiences with Intimate Partner Abuse Using an Integrated Approach, 1 FEMINIST
CRIMINOLOGY 106 (2006) (examining domestic partner abuse to illustrate how
intersections of race and gender lead to better understandings of feminist criminology).
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My intention here is to offer a useful model that links discourse around
gender and discretion and deviates from traditional approaches to crime
and inequality.
It is also worth noting that discretion does not fully explain the
bewildering rates of American incarceration, but it is an area of inquiry that
sheds light on administrative rulemaking, street-level bureaucracies, and
the production of social inequalities. Discretion is inherently necessary for
an efficient criminal justice system where one accepts both the reality that
individual cases are unique and the pesky fact that discretion is often the
source of ambiguous rulemaking. Sometimes the civic and social cost of
bringing a lawbreaker into the criminal justice system may exceed the
benefit. Moreover, the cascade of crimes and criminals that enter the
system make it impossible to investigate and prosecute all cases. Thus, it is
important not to designate this administrative device as “good” or “bad.”
Abuse of discretion is the imperative problem and this discussion seeks to
show how these misuses are a byproduct of the discreet nature of this
necessary bureaucratic feature.
II. UNDERSTANDING DISCRETION
A. Discretion as Discreetness
Roscoe Pound identifies discretion as “an authority conferred by law to
act in certain conditions or situations in accordance with an official’s or an
official agency’s own considered judgment and conscience.”15 Pound is
pointing to discretionary power and the ability of state actors to determine
legal outcomes, which is the popular understanding of discretion often used
in law, criminology, and socio-legal scholarship. But we must append to
this definition a conceptualization of discretion that points to the discreet
nature of decision-making in the criminal justice system. This discreetness
entails non-transparency and is best exemplified by the “blue wall of
silence” among police officers and the opaque nature of prosecutorial
discretion by which prosecutors are exempt from the typical restraints,
limitations, and reviews on administrative discretion that apply to other
governmental actors.16
This understanding of discreetness is imperative to understanding
15. Roscoe Pound, Discretion, Dispensation and Mitigation: The Problem of the
Individual Special Case, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 925, 926 (1960).
16. See JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 39 (2007)
(explaining that the political nature of the prosecutor’s official position and America’s
emphasis on the war on crime has led to prosecutors’ unlimited discretion to choose
whether to bring criminal charges and select who will be exposed to criminal
penalties).
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discretion because the power to conceal (intentionally and unintentionally)
fundamentally guides and changes legal outcomes. There is a hefty body
of scholarship that highlights discrimination in the criminal justice
system.17 There is less discussion on discretion, which is important
because the lack of transparency in the criminal justice system (especially
for police and prosecutors) creates veiled and often illicit spaces where
disparate impact and disadvantage are salient, but dismissed by American
jurisprudence’s rigid impact and intent template.18 I call these veiled
spaces the interstices of discretion—seemingly race- and gender-neutral
stages where discretion can have a detrimental impact on women, the poor,
and racial minorities. Understanding these discreet sites and stages is
important to gaining a deeper understanding of gender discrimination.
B. Widening Our Lens
As noted earlier, discussions on discretion tend to focus exclusively on
one or a cluster of stages. These approaches are animated by institutional
and intellectual constraints. Police chiefs, prosecutors, judges, and other
actors are often overwhelmed by their professional duties and have little
time for substantive intercommunication.
In contrast, academics
overspecialize, which leads experts on racial profiling to be
unknowledgeable about prosecutorial charging or plea bargaining.19
Related to this overspecialization is disciplinary sectarianism, a feature
salient in academia despite the vogue of interdisciplinarity; scholars often
become invested in their disciplines and methodologies and their
explanatory value, which often limits what we can learn about bureaucratic
decision-making.
But if we look at discretion more expansively, then we begin to see
larger systemic problems as opposed to individual instances of misused
discretion. In fact, one of the more vexing challenges of addressing
misused discretion is getting people to recognize that problems lie not only
in the occasional bad behavior or poor judgment of institutional actors, but
in entire institutionalized systems of police and prosecutorial training,
17. E.g., JOANNE BELKNAP, THE INVISIBLE WOMAN: GENDER, CRIME, AND JUSTICE
(3d ed. 2007); MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA (1995); see BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA
(2006) (synthesizing multiple perspectives on the source and perpetuation of
discrimination in the criminal justice system based on race, social status, and the nature
of the crime, and describing how such discrimination produces a disparate impact on
the incarceration and rehabilitation processes for minorities and women).
18. E.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312-13 (1987); Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976).
19. See SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1950-1990 13 (1993) (articulating that fragmentation exists among
intellectuals and institutional actors alike, where isolation in both proximity and field of
expertise creates problems in the criminal justice system).
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management, and culture.20 Adopting a more expansive vision of
discretion allows analysts to account more properly for structure and
agency and allows us to see that issues of discretion are core problems in
the criminal justice system.
III. SITES AND STAGES OF DISCRETION
A. Understanding Institutional Fields and Bureaucratic Patriarchy
My third suggestion is that investigations of discretion must examine
institutional fields/structures and interrogate how they influence an actor’s
patterned ways of thinking and behavior. Institutional structures and
individual action reciprocally influence each other, a claim central to the
discipline of sociology.21 The insights of Pierre Bourdieu are useful
because his concepts of field and habitus can help us understand how
gender operates in the criminal justice system. A field is loosely defined as
a setting where different positions are grounded in relationships of power
(e.g., the cop and the offender in the apprehension stage) that are
professionally and disciplinarily defined.22 Habitus consists of acquired
dispositions, behaviors, learned habits, attitudes and/or tastes developed by
institutional structures and fields.23 Habitus leads people to recreate the
social order consciously and unconsciously through discourses, practices,
and dispositions that are often uncritically acknowledged.24 This is
particularly important because gender bias can be produced intentionally or
unintentionally, as gender is implicated in criminal justice discretion as
soon as an individual joins the police academy.
The academy is where students learn practices, rules, and procedures of
20. See REGINA G. LAWRENCE, THE POLITICS OF FORCE: MEDIA AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF POLICE BRUTALITY xii (2000) (proposing that it is difficult to
generate serious and sustained attention to police brutality because the public does not
understand the full impact of police culture’s influence on the criminal justice system).
21. E.g., PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1966); PIERRE BOURDIEU &
RICHARD NICE, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE (1977); MICHEL FOUCAULT,
DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (1976); ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE
CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY: OUTLINE OF THE THEORY OF STRUCTURATION (1986).
22. See generally BOURDIEU & NICE, supra note 21, at 21 (describing the concept
of a structured social space with its own rules, schemes of domination, and legitimate
opinions); PIERRE BOURDIEU & LOÏC J.D. WACQUANT, AN INVITATION TO REFLEXIVE
SOCIOLOGY 102 (1992).
23. See BOURDIEU & NICE, supra note 21, at 17-21, 76-88 (defining the term as the
strategy-generating principle that enables agents to predict and adapt to an environment
in constant flux).
24. See generally id. Bourdieu’s concepts are much more rich and entail a
complexity beyond what can be offered here, but most broadly, they offer a useful
starting point for considering how structure and bureaucratic discretion relate to each
other.

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol18/iss3/11

8

Ossei-Owusu: Gimme Some More: Centering Gender and Inequality in Criminal Just
OSSEI-OWUSU 3/7/10

2010]

10/22/2010 2:26:08 PM

GIMME SOME MORE

615

police work. Attention to the training academy offers useful insights into
the patriarchal socialization of law enforcement agents and highlights the
reality that men have historically had a monopoly on organized violence
(e.g., policing, the military, and the mafia).25 Anastasia Prokos and Irene
Padavic’s ethnographic research shows how the academy simultaneously
produces an explicit and hidden curriculum, with the former operating
under a seemingly gender-neutral organizational logic and the latter
valorizing masculinity while degrading women.26 This hidden curriculum
consisted of highly gendered language, resistance to powerful women’s
authority, the belittling of women’s issues (e.g., women’s victimization,
domestic violence, and rape), and the instructional material that engages
these topics. Masculine culture is so hardwired into policing that it is often
the main impetus for the early resignation of female police officers.27
This male-dominated culture is even more prominent in police
departments, as empirical data has overwhelmingly documented the sexist
nature of policing.28 Various forms of gender discrimination—such as
occupational segregation (e.g., relegating women to paperwork),
innuendoes about policewomen’s sexuality (e.g., the use of the terms
“dyke” and “whore”), and most notably sexual harassment—occur within
police departments, but are rarely exposed out of fear of public relations
nightmares.29 In departments where corruption, use of extralegal force, and
bureaucratic malfeasance are prevalent, men are especially resistant to
25. See RAEWYN CONNELL, GENDER AND POWER: SOCIETY, THE PERSON, AND
SEXUAL POLITICS 187 (1987) (characterizing the traditional differences between themes
of masculinity and femininity, notably the much lower level of violence between
women than between men).
26. See Anastasia Prokos & Irene Padavic, “There Oughtta Be a Law Against
Bitches”: Masculinity Lessons in Police Academy Training, 9 GEN., WORK & ORG.
440, 443-44 (2002) (distinguishing the overt insults male officers direct at female
officers from the more implicit gender stereotypes reinforced in school in order to
analogize these phenomena to the discrimination found in police academy curricula).
27. See Robin N. Haarr, Factors Affecting the Decision of Police Recruits to “Drop
Out” of Police Work, 8 POLICE Q. 431, 446 (2005) (pointing to the significant influence
of traditional masculine values in the police force, which lead to antagonism and
harassment of female officers, and influence women’s decisions to self-initiate
resignation from the force).
28. See, e.g., SUSAN EHRLICH MARTIN, BREAKING AND ENTERING: POLICEWOMEN
ON PATROL (1980); SUSAN EHRLICH MARTIN & NANCY C. JURIK, DOING JUSTICE,
DOING GENDER: WOMEN IN LEGAL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE OCCUPATIONS (2006)
(evincing various data on the interplay between gender and race and its influence on the
perspectives of policewomen and women working in criminal justice occupations in the
male-dominated working environment at the police station, on patrol, in corrections,
and in court); Mary Thierry Texeira, “Who Protects and Serves Me?”: A Case Study of
Sexual Harassment of African American Women in One U.S. Law Enforcement Agency,
16 GENDER & SOC’Y 524 (2002).
29. See Prokos & Padavic, supra note 26, at 443 (presenting evidence that
resistance from male officers to women’s roles in the force manifests itself in multiple
layers of physical and verbal abuse, that go beyond preventing female encroachment
and that cross the line into intimidating existing officers into quitting).
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female integration.
Since women are considered “outsiders” and
scrupulous, male officers and supervisors suspect women of exposing
misconduct and try to temper female integration by reinforcing male bonds
and further concealing sexist practices.30 This discreetness is very much
related to the “code of silence” or the “the informal prohibition within
police culture of reporting misconduct by fellow officers.”31
Gendered discrimination within policing institutions does not precisely
get at police discretion in terms of determining legal outcomes for lay
citizens, but it is instructive for several reasons. On a rudimentary level it
helps us understand how gender is considered (or not considered) in
organizational settings within the criminal justice system. It helps
illuminate the cultural-institutional landscape that officers operate in, which
fundamentally informs how they perform their duties.
Gender
discrimination within police culture also helps us think about discretion as
discreetness via bureaucratic inertia (e.g., the persistence of sexism in
police culture despite modest female integration) and through the lack of
transparency in police institutions (e.g., the veiled sexism). The police
academy and department are where the social power of men and masculine
norms are expressed, and the work environments often reflect those
norms.32
B. Police Practices and Preemptive Investigations
Preemptive police practices and investigations are an important site of
analysis because they entail crime prevention. “Racial profiling” is a term
that has become common in our national lexicon on crime, but less critical
attention has been given to “gender profiling” and the gendered element of
preventative policing. The landmark case Terry v. Ohio is useful to
consider here as the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourth
Amendment is not violated when police stop and frisk someone for
weapons as long as they have a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is
armed and has committed a crime or will commit a crime.33 Terry expands
30. See Jennifer C. Hunt, The Logic of Sexism Among Police, 2 WOMEN & CRIM.
JUST. 3, 10, 12 (1990) (illustrating the perception that female officers threaten the
cultural domain of male police officers’ collective corruption and violence, because
women, consistent with their putatively domestic and virtuous impulses, will expose
and clean males’ moral transgressions on the job).
31. SANJA KUTNJAK IVKOVIĆ, FALLEN BLUE KNIGHTS: CONTROLLING POLICE
CORRUPTION 8 (2005).
32. See Kathryn Abrams, New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL
L. REV. 1169, 1210 (1999) (noting that common male behaviors like roughhousing or
having lewd images of women in the workplace are deemed normal practices rather
than male-dominated influences).
33. See 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (permitting stop and frisks based solely on an
officer’s reasonable suspicion and to protect the safety of the officer or the surrounding
public).
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police discretion and has significant race and class undertones, as poor
Black and Latino neighborhoods will be the spaces where police can use
subjective perceptions of danger or potential criminal activity as subterfuge
to assert authority.34 Women of color are often presumed to be peripheral
or central actors in the informal drug economy, and their categorization as
drug couriers leaves them especially vulnerable to abuses of Terry.35
Socially stigmatized women such as the mentally ill, homeless, immigrants,
transgendered women, domestic violence survivors, sex workers, and
female drug users are specific targets of police misconduct via preemptive
discretionary power.36 These women are less likely to report misconduct
because of a general fear or warranted distrust of the police, language
barriers, and fear of being deported or arrested for prior criminal conduct.
When these women report the crimes they are often unlikely to be
believed,37 which reduces our ability to grasp fully the problem of police
misconduct and gender discrimination. In this interstice of discretion we
see how the discreet nature of police decision-making, coupled with statesanctioned power, can produce gender inequality that can often go
unnoticed.
Over-policing and profiling dominate the discussion on race, class,
gender, and crime, but underenforcement of the law is an equally, if not
more egregious, phenomenon.38 Specifically, underenforcement is not
subject to review;39 formal statistics of underenforcement are not kept;40
34. See id. at 39 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s holding
allows police officers to “search” and “seize” individuals at the officers’ discretion if
they simply do not like the individual’s appearance or mannerisms).
35. See Tammy L. Anderson, Dimensions of Women’s Power in the Illicit Drug
Economy, 9 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 371, 381-89 (2005) (suggesting that women
are powerful actors in the drug world and that their work is central to the drug
economy). But see Goldfarb, supra note 9, at 291-92 (arguing that women maintain
subsidiary roles in the drug economy and that they are connected through relationships
with drug dealers).
36. See Andrea J. Ritchie & Joey L. Mogul, In the Shadows of the War on Terror:
Persistent Police Brutality and Abuse of People of Color in the United States, 1
DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 175, 220 (2008) (determining that officers tend to prey on these
groups of vulnerable women since these women would have less credibility if they
were to report the abuse).
37. See id. (citing the example of Latina immigrants, documented and
undocumented, repeatedly reporting rapes by local law enforcement agents along the
U.S.-Mexico border).
38. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW 19 (1997) (arguing that the
principal injury suffered by African-Americans in criminal law is not overenforcement,
but underenforcement of the law).
39. See Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process;
Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 552 (1959)
(observing that unless police officers commit a “gross failure of service,” neither the
community nor state agencies are aware when officers are not properly doing their
jobs).
40. See Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution: Discovering the
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underenforcement decreases the amount of crime that is officially
recognized;41 and it increases real crime by giving some offenders solace in
knowing that certain crimes won’t be investigated rigorously.42
Underpolicing is also a feature of preventative policing that reproduces
gender subordination. Underpolicing is manifested through unsolved
homicides, slow or nonexistent 911 responses, as well as the tolerance of
open-air drug markets, violence, property crimes, and public disorder. It
often occurs because of lack of political will (malign neglect or the
tendency to underserve the politically weak) and poor police-community
relations.43 Underpolicing in poor neighborhoods corresponds to the
disinvestment and erosion of social welfare institutions in marginalized
communities—institutions that are presumed to satisfactorily provide civic
goods and services (e.g., welfare, education, housing, and health care), but
often fail in their goals.44 This failure often leads residents to rely on their
own informal institutions (e.g., gangs, friendships, and kin ties) to achieve
some semblance of public safety.45 The discreet nature of underforcement
and police discretion is further veiled by the Supreme Court, whose holding
in the recent Castle Rock v. Gonzales case asserts that a police
Pitfalls of Armstrong, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV 605, 641 (1998) (drawing inferences from
the lack of statistical data that many cases are simply dismissed when they should not
be).
41. See Barry Goetz, Organization as Class Bias in Local Law Enforcement:
Arson-for-Profit as a “Nonissue,” 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 557, 565 (1997) (using the
example of arson-for-profit as exemplifying a nonissue to law-enforcement).
42. See Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715 (2006)
(citing the story of Angela Dawson, whose death was the result of police inaction as
she was eventually killed by the drug dealers against whom she had continually filed
police reports); see also Jeffrey Gettleman, Fire Kills Mother and Children at Home,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2002, at A22; Del Quentin Wilber, Recordings, Court Documents
Show Dawson Family’s Battles: 911, 311 Requests For Help Made One Month Before
Fire Show Fear, Frustration, BALT. SUN, Feb. 17, 2003, available at
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2003-02-17/news/0302170024_1_dawson-familyrecordings-carnell.
43. See Natapoff, supra note 42, at 1723-24 (comparing police action in affluent
neighborhoods with low crime rates to police action in minority neighborhoods with
higher crime rates).
44. See Loïc J.D. Wacquant, Negative Social Capital: State Breakdown and Social
Destitution in America’s Urban Core, 13 J. HOUSING & BUILT ENV’T 25, 29 (1998)
(detailing the lack of adequate funds to support much needed aid programs and police
protection in poor minority neighborhoods in Chicago); see also Natapoff, supra note
42, at 1729 (contrasting the types of services people in affluent neighborhoods of
Boston expect from the police with how people in poorer neighborhoods accept much
lower standards of service).
45. See, e.g., Mary E. Pattillo, Sweet Mothers and Gangbangers: Managing Crime
in a Black Middle-Class Neighborhood, 76 SOC. FORCES 747, 755 (1998) (citing the
acceptance of interactions between drug dealers and law-abiding citizens in a Chicago
neighborhood in order to preserve peace); see also Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, The Social
Organization of Street Gang Activity in an Urban Ghetto, 103 AM. J. SOC. 82 (1997)
(examining gang-community relationships and how gangs complicate and contribute to
the social fabric of poor neighborhoods).
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department’s failure to enforce a court-mandated restraining order is not
unconstitutional.46
This underenforcement has severe consequences for women. First,
socially stigmatized women become more vulnerable to various kinds of
crimes (e.g., assault, rape, sexual violence, and robbery), as perpetrators
believe that these cases will not be investigated thoroughly. Additionally,
social scientists have commented on the decidedly masculine nature of
poor and urban neighborhoods.47 Similarly, underpolicing creates a more
precarious situation for female residents by normalizing violence against
women and weakening their expectations of state protection.48 This
discretionary inaction of underenforcement often leads to the
underreporting of crime, makes people distrustful of police, and reifies the
idea of minorities and poor people as uncooperative with police. This
suspicion intensifies officers’ “us” versus “them” mentality and alienates
police and the public. The ethnographic work of the late Esther Madriz
shows us how fear of crime uniquely impacts women of different ages and
socioeconomic backgrounds, restricts their freedom (by determining when
and where to travel, what route to take, how to dress, and how to act), and
reinforces their subordination.49 Underpolicing exacerbates the social
control of women and makes their victimization less visible.
C. Arrests
As I suggested at LatCrit, the arrest stage is useful to consider because of
its multi-faceted nature; it entails the decision to act or not to act (on behalf
of female victims) and it is typically a suspect’s first interaction with the
state. This is particularly important considering the autonomy and low
visibility of policing. In regards to (in)action, as noted earlier, crimes
against women are often not taken seriously by law enforcement. This
claim is buttressed by the empirical reality that police often view battered
women of color as less deserving of legal protection and often offer a lower
quality of response to their victimization.50 This inaction is endured by
46. See 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005) (determining that police inaction in failing to
enforce a restraining order is not a violation of a citizen’s due process rights).
47. See, e.g., ELIJAH ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET: DECENCY, VIOLENCE, AND
THE MORAL LIFE OF THE INNER CITY 32 (1995); CAROL BROOKS GARDNER, PASSING
BY: GENDER AND PUBLIC HARASSMENT 103 (1995); MILLER, supra note 12, at 154
(analyzing the code of the street in impoverished neighborhoods as accepting
interpersonal violence, aggression, and harassment against women).
48. See Natapoff, supra note 42, at 1750 (explaining inner city perceptions of
police as unprincipled, biased, and unreliable gangs).
49. See ESTHER MADRIZ, NOTHING BAD HAPPENS TO GOOD GIRLS: FEAR OF CRIME
IN WOMEN’S LIVES 2 (1997) (arguing that the fear of crime contributes to the social
control of women that undermines women’s power, rights, and achievements).
50. See Amanda L. Robinson & Meghan S. Chandek, Differential Police Response
to Black Battered Women, 12 WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 29, 33 (2000) (indicating that law
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women who need it the most—as women in disadvantaged neighborhoods
are thirty-three percent more likely to experience intimate violence than
those in affluent neighborhoods.51
For potential female offenders/suspects, the low visibility of policing
also poses problems. Police misconduct that does not fall under the
egregious category of rape often goes unacknowledged and misconduct
ranging from obtrusive behavior (e.g., custodial strip searches and body
cavity searches) to criminal behavior (e.g., sexual contact and harassment)
is especially difficult to adjudicate under the discriminatory intent template
and can be circumvented, respectively, by claims of evidence preservation
or plain old denial.52 In fact, individual officers often have vague
definitions of sexual misbehavior and police departments sometimes do not
have formal policies regarding sexual misconduct.53 This poses problems
for poor, young women of color, who are particularly vulnerable to this
misconduct and often have few avenues of redress or recourse.54 In this
interstice of discretion we see how seemingly gender-neutral practices and
bureaucratic decision-making can intentionally and unintentionally produce
gender inequality.
D. Charging
Gender is equally implicated in the charging process. Prosecutorial
charging plays a significant role in how a case is adjudicated. Since one
criminal act can typically be charged under a variety of statutes, the amount
of charges filed and their extremity (e.g., misdemeanor or felony) are
paramount. One explanation for the increase in female incarceration stems
from the availability of conspiracy statutes to prosecutors. Originally
enforcement’s views result from the belief that violence is a way of life for women of
color).
51. See Michael L. Benson, et al., Neighborhood Disadvantage, Individual
Economic Distress and Violence Against Women in Intimate Relationships, 19
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 207, 227 (2003) (acknowledging that according to the
“Logistic Regression Model of Intimate Violence,” women’s rate of exposure to
domestic violence in disadvantaged neighborhoods remains higher even after
controlling for prior violence, economic distress, and male substance abuse).
52. See Peter B. Kraska & Victor E. Kappeler, To Serve and Pursue: Exploring
Police Sexual Violence Against Women, 12 JUST. Q. 85, 94 (1995) (noting the possible
institutional and cultural support for sexually obtrusive and criminal behavior by
police).
53. See Timothy M. Maher, Police Sexual Misconduct: Officers’ Perceptions of Its
Extent and Causality, 28 CRIM. JUST. REV. 355, 356-57 (2003) (recognizing that not
everyone shares the same idea of what is considered police sexual misconduct, based
on the specific rules or lack thereof that each department establishes).
54. See MILLER, supra note 12, at 3 (arguing that violence against young women is
especially acute in disadvantaged neighborhoods); Rod K. Brunson & Jody Miller,
Gender, Race, and Urban Policing: The Experience of African American Youths, 20
GENDER & SOC’Y 531, 533 (2006).
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reserved for the mafia, these statutes made prosecution of coconspirators
(from kingpins to foot soldiers) much easier, with the consequence of
absorbing female partners of suspects into the system—some of whom
were marginally involved in criminal activity or “trapped in abusive
relationships in which their criminal activity occurred in the context of a
relationship where they had little control.”55
If we consider discretion in the context of bureaucratic inaction, we see
how a significant number of sexual assault cases are foreclosed at the
charging phase, as prosecutors have developed several techniques to
discredit victim’s claims and circumvent prosecuting such cases. Some of
these techniques include attempts to discover discrepancies and
incongruence in the victim’s story; reliance on myopic classifications of
rape-relevant behavior; attempts to unearth incriminating knowledge of the
victim’s personal life, circumstances, and criminal connections; and
presumptions of ulterior motives for reporting the assault.56 Such
prosecutorial misconduct is discreet and operates under the radar since
prosecutors have been exempted from the typical regime of restraints,
limitations, and reviews on administrative discretion that apply to other
governmental actors—making them important players in the criminal
justice system.57
Considering the law’s differential posture on parenting, women are
charged and sentenced more vigorously for child abandonment than men.
Males can easily escape criminal responsibility, whereas females are often
inscribed in a misguided socio-cultural logic that suggests that a woman’s
status as child-bearer determines her social identity.58 Just like the decision
to arrest, the charging stage consists of the option to act or to not act, with
55. See ANTHONY C. THOMPSON, RELEASING PRISONERS, REDEEMING
COMMUNITIES: REENTRY, RACE, AND POLITICS 51 (2008) (explaining the case of
Kemba Smith, a college student at Hampton University who entered into a romantic
relationship with a local drug kingpin, and stating that despite being peripheral to her
boyfriend’s drug trade, she was sentenced to twenty-four years in prison and held
responsible for 255 kilograms of cocaine; she was eventually pardoned by President
Clinton).
56. See Lisa Frohmann, Discrediting Victims’ Allegations of Sexual Assault:
Prosecutorial Accounts of Case Rejections, 38 SOC. PROBS. 213, 217 (1991)
(illustrating a scenario where a prosecutor discredits a victim’s account of a rape by
comparing it to his typification of how the crime usually occurs).
57. See SIMON, supra note 16, at 39 (concluding that prosecutors’ exemption from
discipline for misconduct has strengthened their unlimited discretion and power in the
criminal justice system).
58. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood,
1 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1, 4 (1993) (explaining the socially enforced identity of
motherhood and its relationship to patriarchy and racism); Matthew T. Zingraff &
Randall J. Thomson, Differential Sentencing of Women and Men in the U.S.A., 12
INT’L J. SOC. L. 401, 410 (observing that women have been stereotyped in our society
as irrational, emotional, sneaky, dependent, submissive, and childlike and are thus
punished for these characteristics in court).
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either option entailing wider socio-legal significance.
As penal
bureaucrats, prosecutors’ action or inaction are manifested as the state’s
policy toward different types of sexual violence as well as different
women’s contextual circumstances.
IV. CONCLUSION
I have attempted to offer some exploratory thoughts on how discretion in
the criminal justice system reproduces gender inequality, and certainly
every stone has not been unturned. My main intention is to provoke a more
substantive discussion on discretionary power and discreetness in the
aggregate. Prescriptive policy suggestions are always difficult to make
since rules and practices vary on local, state, and regional levels. I want to
refrain from offering policy directives and offer a more modest proposal.
Although seemingly trite, a push for transparency that is anchored by
intellectual insights and experiences of the formerly incarcerated and
wrongfully convicted (and their families) would be powerful. There are
interim approaches to tempering a race-, class-, and gender-biased criminal
justice system: (1) increased transparency through surveillance of streetlevel bureaucrats as opposed to just the public;59 (2) systematic
documentation of traffic stops and prosecutorial charging; and (3)
establishing independent review boards that have the power to randomly
audit police departments and prosecutors’ offices.60 I offer this provisional
element particularly because more scholarship is needed. In fact, the
relationship between more research and transparency is symbiotic, as
detailed scholarship would allow us to glean more insight into how
discretion works in the criminal justice system.
I come back to the final point I suggested at LatCrit, and that is the idea
that analyses on discretion must look at institutional cleavages and use
interdisciplinary insight to offer policy and theoretical recommendations.
As I suggested earlier, discretion occurs at various stages in the system and
recognition of institutional cleavages is integral to understanding discretion
cumulatively. Interdisciplinary research and scholarship are keys to these
endeavors. Organizational sociology and qualitative research can reveal to
us how street-level bureaucrats use their discretion and how their decisionmaking satisfies, challenges, or fails to meet organizational imperatives.
Anthropological and ethnographic research could add to the rich literature

59. See CHRISTIAN PARENTI, THE SOFT CAGE: SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA FROM
SLAVERY TO THE WAR ON TERROR 174 (2003) (recognizing that electronic monitoring
has enhanced the state’s power and discretion over parolees, probationers, and the
public).
60. See DAVIS, supra note 7, at 179-94 (suggesting prosecution review boards as
one of the many prospects for reform).
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on policing and offer insight into the discreet nature of police culture.61
Quantitative researchers and stratification scholars could develop models
to measure discretion and its impact on different social groups.62 Through
survey research, experimental models, and interview data, social and legal
psychologists could examine street-level bureaucrats’ thoughts, feelings,
and behaviors and how they influence discretion and the delivery of public
services across various axes of difference. Psychologists could also
investigate how unconscious bias manifests itself in discretion.63 Legal
scholars could engage in participant observation (which tends to be used
more on the police side than on the juridical side) to capture the inner
workings of the courtroom and could also analyze how court decisions,
statutes, and policies on the national, state, and local levels influence
bureaucratic decision-making. This model may also offer legal scholars an
alternative approach to tackling the intent doctrine.
Understanding the ambiguities and silences of discretion and their
relationship to race, class, and gender provide a productive way to think
about the criminal justice system. This discretion is also present and
noteworthy in other public service agencies such as schools, welfare
offices, health agencies, and other industries where professional
discernment is employed and determines the distribution of materials, life
chances, and social outcomes. A focus on the interstices of discretion and
disproportionate impact can yield insights that produce actionable items for
prospective reformers, as opposed to focusing on only disparate impact,
which produces insights, but is restrained by conservative American
jurisprudence. Until the fundamental issues of discretion are addressed, we
will continue to possess truncated and distorted versions of equality and
61. See, e.g., DAVID H. BAYLEY, POLICE FOR THE FUTURE 56 (1994); MICHAEL K.
BROWN, WORKING FOR THE STREET: POLICE DISCRETION AND THE DILEMMAS OF
REFORM 3 (1981); PETER MOSKOS, COP IN THE HOOD: MY YEAR POLICING
BALTIMORE’S EASTERN DISTRICT 3 (2008) (analyzing the routine decision-making and
discretion of police as they administer justice on the streets).
62. See WESTERN, supra note 17, at 65 (presenting a chart that examines judicial
discretion in criminal sentencing). See generally Celesta A. Albonetti, Prosecutorial
Discretion: The Effects of Uncertainty, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 291 (1987) (describing
the relationship between prosecutorial uncertainty in decision making and the decision
to "go forward" with charges); Stephen Demuth & Darrell Steffensmeier, The Impact of
Gender and Race-Ethnicity in the Pretrial Release Process, 51 SOC. PROBS. 22 (2004)
(describing the effects of gender and race/ethnicity in pretrial release decisions).
63. See Ian F. Haney-Lopez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New
Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1823 (2000) (presenting a
distinction between institutional and purposeful racism while commenting on American
jurisprudence's poor template for understanding discrimination). See generally Gary
Blasi, Advocacy against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49
UCLA L. REV. 1241 (presenting an overview of social science literature on stereotypes
and prejudice and its implications for lawyers).
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justice.
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